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Antitrust and the “Filed Rate” Doctrine: 
Deregulation and State Action  
 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Introduction; Keogh1 and Square D2 
 
 Speaking through Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court held in Keogh that although 
the Interstate Commerce Act did not exempt railroads from antitrust liability, a private 
plaintiff may not recover treble damages based on an allegedly monopolistic tariff rate 
filed with the ICC.
3
 Keogh very likely grew out of Justice Brandeis's own zeal for 
regulation and his concern for the protection of small business—in this case, mainly 
shippers whom he felt were protected from discrimination by filed rates.
4
 The Keogh 
doctrine served to absolutize regulated rates by making them nearly immune from 
collateral attack. Under various degrees of deregulation, the doctrine makes little sense. 
Justice Brandeis gave four reasons for this rule, each of which was later criticized by 
Judge Friendly (although he ultimately followed Keogh) in the Square D case. First, 
Justice Brandeis doubted the need for an antitrust remedy, for Interstate Commerce Act 
§8
5
 gave shippers injured by illegal filed rates their actual damages plus attorney's 
                                                 
*
 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
1
Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). The doctrine applies not only to the 
antitrust laws, but to non-antitrust challenges as well. See AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel Co., Inc., 
524 U.S. 214 (1998) (state law tortious interference and contract claims brought by reseller of 
defendant's digital telephone services barred by filed rate doctrine). For the various complexities 
that can arise when either the agency or the antitrust law is state rather than federal, see 14 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2411i (3d ed. 2012). Some cases speak of the “filed 
tariff” rather than filed rate doctrine. 
See also Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003) (filed rate doctrine, 
which is federal, requires that state regulatory agencies give federal filed rates binding effect). 
2
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 
476 U.S. 409 (1986). 
3
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has been abolished and some of its activities 
have been taken over by the Surface Transportation Board. See ¶251i. Although many of the 
cases discussing the filed rate doctrine concerned ICC rates, the doctrine applies to all state and 
federal regulatory agencies that require the filing of tariffs containing rates. 
4
See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BRANDEIS AS LEGAL SEER, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 711 (2004); THOMAS 
K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES 
M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN (1984). See also Paul Brickner, Different Styles and Similar 
Values: The Reformer Roles of Charles Evens Hughes and Louis Dembitz Brandeis in Gas, 
Electric, and Insurance Regulation, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 893 (2000); Clyde Spillenger, Elusive 
Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 Yale L.J. 1445 (1996); Henry W. 
Bikle, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Regulation of Railroads, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1931). 
5
Later at 49 U.S.C. §11705(b). 
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 However, Judge Friendly pointed out that antitrust damages are often available to 
those with remedies under other bodies of federal law.
7
 Moreover, no remedy would be 
available from the ICC for an approved rate that had in fact been the product of an 




Second, Justice Brandeis emphasized that the filed rate was legal for all purposes 
and not to be “varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”
9
 Granting an 
antitrust damage remedy to some shippers would result in an arbitrarily discriminatory 
rate structure inconsistent with the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act to prevent 
rate discrimination among shippers. Even if every shipper brought an action, the net 
rates would be discriminatory “unless the highly improbable happened, and the several 
juries and courts gave to each the same measure of relief.”
10
 But Judge Friendly pointed 
out that modern class actions increase the likelihood that all shippers affected by a 
monopoly rate can be joined and receive uniform relief and that the Brandeis argument 
proves too much. In all cases, one who recovers treble damages from a supplier 
receives a lower net price than those who do not. This puts the successful plaintiff in a 




Third, Justice Brandeis noted that antitrust damages depend on proof that the rate 
paid exceeded the hypothetical rate that would have prevailed in the absence of the 
illegal conduct and that this hypothetical rate would have been approved by the ICC. 
What the ICC would have approved is a question better determined, at least initially, by 
the Commission rather than by the courts.
12
 But antitrust damages, far from forcing any 
particular rate on the ICC, merely reflect an estimate of what the price would otherwise 
have been—neither more nor less accurately than in antitrust cases generally.
13
 Nor are 
damages necessarily more intrusive on agency processes than the antitrust injunctions 
available to private parties.
14
 
Finally, Justice Brandeis believed that a shipper would not really be injured by an 
illegal rate that applied equally to its competitors, for all of them would then simply pass 
on the overcharge to their customers. The loss they actually absorbed would be purely 
                                                 
6
Keogh, supra, 260 U.S. at 162-163. 
7
Square D, supra, 760 F.2d at 1354. 
8
Id. at 1354-1355. 
9




Square D, supra, 760 F.2d at 1352. 
12
 Keogh, supra, 260 U.S. at 163-164. 
13
 Square D, supra, 760 F.2d at 1353. 
14
Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). Of course, no antitrust remedy is available 
against conduct that the agency is empowered to exempt from the antitrust laws. For some time 
the Reed-Bullwinkle Act created an absolute immunity for joint ratemaking approved by the 
ICC. 49 U.S.C. §10706B. But the Motor Carrier Reform Act of 1980 eliminated the immunity. 
Section 14(a), Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 804 (July 1, 1980); codified at various sections of 49 
U.S.C. 
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 But subsequent antitrust rulings have allowed those who pay an illegal 
overcharge to recover it (trebled) whether or not they passed it on.
16
 In any event, even 
if shippers in competition with one another are not injured significantly, the larger injury 
would accrue to consumers who would ultimately pay more for goods or services 
delivered by common carriers, or produced with energy supplied by price-regulated 
utilities. 
The Supreme Court's Square D decision conceded that Keogh may have been 
“unwise as a matter of policy,”
17
 but reaffirmed it nonetheless on the ground that 
Congress had had ample opportunity to overturn it but had not done so.
18
 Since then 
                                                 
15
Keogh, supra, 260 U.S. at 164-165. 
16
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). See ¶346. 
17
Square D, supra, 476 U.S. at 420. 
18
Id. Applications of Keogh to preclude antitrust damage actions include  Simon v. Keyspan 
Corp., 694 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2012) (filed rate doctrine precluded action against electric rates filed 
with FERC);   AT&T Corp. v. JMC Telecom., LLC, 470 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
551 U.S. 1103 (2007) (Keogh barred claim by communications purchaser–reseller that defendant 
provided substandard service, following AT&T Corp. v. Central Off. Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 233 
(1998); Arsberry v. State of Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1062 (2001) 
(discussing filed rate doctrine in antitrust challenge by prison inmates to exclusive agreement 
between state prison and single long distance carrier, resulting in compensation to prison and 
high fees to prisoners making telephone calls; Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 
F.3d 408 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 818 (2000) (Keogh precludes claim of small utility 
wishing to purchase wholesale power from defendant and claiming a price squeeze); Lifschultz 
Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1277 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd, 998 
F.2d 1009 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 993 (1993) (Keogh precludes private suit claiming 
that firms regulated by ICC rigged bids by submitting false data to the agency); Berning v. 
Gooding, 643 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D. Or. 1985), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1550 (9th Cir. 1987) (same; 
agricultural products whose prices were regulated by Secretary of Agriculture under Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act); Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litig., 759 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986) (railroads immune from antitrust claims of alleged 
price fixing in rates of wheat transport, notwithstanding that they failed to follow all procedures 
for filing an agreed upon rate by not giving notice to all prescribed persons or requesting a 
hearing); Minsky v. Auto Drivaway, 757 F.2d 718 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984) 
(filed rate doctrine applied to automobile driveaway services, whose rates were filed with ICC); 
W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 368 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D. Nev. 2005), rev’d 
and remanded, 243 Fed.Appx. 328, 2007 WL 2806331, 2007-2 Trade Cas. ¶75,879 (9th Cir. 
Sept. 24, 2007, unpub.) (lawsuit alleging that natural gas companies conspired to falsely report 
gas prices, engaged in fraudulent trades designed to create illusion of market that was more 
active than it was in fact, and false reporting of transactions was barred by Keogh where rates 
were filed and FERC had plenary jurisdiction over all issues relating to such rates); Texas 
Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 2004 WL 1777597, 2004-2 Trade Cas. ¶74,497 (S.D. 
Tex. June 24, 2004), aff'd, 413 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1091 (2006) 
(electricity reseller's federal and state antitrust challenges to high rates in the Balancing Energy 
Service market barred by filed rate doctrine, even though rates were set by state regulatory 
agency); Utilimax.com, Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC, 273 F. Supp. 2d 573 (E.D. Pa. 2003), 
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the Supreme Court and lower courts have persisted in applying the doctrine and have 
even broadened its scope. 
The implications of Keogh and Square D are that overcharge actions by consumers 
based on claims that a “filed” rate
19
 constitutes an antitrust violation will be dismissed. 
The rate must merely be filed and technically approved by the agency. It need not have 
                                                                                                                                                             
aff'd, 378 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2004) (filed rate doctrine barred claim by purchaser-reseller of 
electric power); Cal. Wholesale Elec. Antitrust Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (S.D. Cal. 2003), 
aff’d, 384 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1149 (2005) (filed rate doctrine barred 
state antitrust law claim against a rate filed with a federal agency (FERC)); Green v. Peoples 
Energy Corp., 2003 WL 1712566, 2003-1 Trade Cas. ¶73,999 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2003) (filed 
rate doctrine precluded tying challenge to tariff requirement that made company-installed gas 
meters mandatory and required customers to pay a fee for them); Miranda v. Michigan, 141 F. 
Supp. 2d 747 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (filed rate doctrine precluded antitrust claims by recipients of 
long distance collect calls from prisoners, complaining about high collect call rates); Norcen 
Energy Res., Ltd. v. Pac. Gas & Electric Co., 1994 WL 519461, 1994-2 Trade Cas. ¶70,851 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 1994, unreported) (rejecting gas purchaser's argument that Keogh does not 
apply to a price squeeze created by high federally regulated rates and low state regulated rates). 
See also Cnty. of Stanislaus v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 1995 WL 819150, 1996-1 Trade Cas. 
¶71,305 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1995), aff'd, 114 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
1076 (1998) (Keogh barred consumer challenge to rates filed with Canadian regulatory agency 
even though agency was not within United States jurisdiction; however, a United States agency 
had actually participated and reviewed the rate in question). 
See also 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶787c1 (3d ed. 
2007), discussing Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 402 (7th Cir. 2000), which held 
that the filed rate doctrine precluded a consumer challenge to a telephone interconnection 
dispute. Accord Stein v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 975 (N.D. Cal.  2001), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 172 Fed.Appx. 192, 2006 WL 751812, 2006-1 Trade Cas. ¶75,287 (9th Cir. Mar. 
22, 2006), on remand, 2007 WL 831750 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2007) (filed rate doctrine precluded 
claim brought by customers that they paid too much to defendant).  Cf. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. 
Encana Energy Servs., Inc., 2005 WL 2230530, 2005-2 Trade Cas. ¶74,955 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 
2005) (whether filed rate doctrine barred plaintiffs' claims presented a fact question when it was 
not clear that the retail rates paid by the plaintiff were determined in accordance with filed 
wholesale rates; the retail rates, which themselves were not filed, could have been set without 
any reference to the wholesale rates; court assumed that if the retail rate was “pegged,” or 
formulated from the wholesale rate, then filing of the wholesale rate precluded a challenge to the 
retail rate). 
19
The “filed rate” doctrine itself is not an antitrust doctrine; it derives from the more general 
public utility rule that once a rate is filed with a regulatory agency, the company is forbidden to 
charge a different rate. See, e.g., Maislin Indus., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 126 
(1990); Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981); Brizendine v. Cotter & Co., 4 F.3d 
457, 460 (7th Cir. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 1103 (1994). Historically, the rule 
was so strict that it entitled a railroad to sue for the shortfall when it undercharged a shipper 
owing to the railroad's own mistake. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 96 
(1915) (“ignorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either less or 
more than the rate filed.”). 
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been actively reviewed for accuracy or public interest considerations—indeed, it need 
not have been reviewed at all in any meaningful sense.
20
 The doctrine operates as a 
rule against collateral attack: once filed, a rate may not be collaterally attacked in the 
courts. However, an objector may be able to ask the regulatory agency to review a rate 
within its jurisdiction, considering the objection.
21
 Of course, that proceeding would not 
be in antitrust and would not provide treble damages and attorney's fees as an 
inducement. 
But the rate must in fact be “filed” before the immunity takes effect.
22
 For example, 
some regulatory regimes regulate some but not all of a firm's prices. An electric utility 
may sell its electricity at regulated rates but sell installation services or appliances in 
competition with private firms at rates that are not regulated at all and are not subject to 
a filed tariff. In that case, the Keogh immunity applies to the former but not to the latter. 
Or, under modern electric utility deregulation, “retail” electric power rates to end users 
are regulated by the agency, while some “wholesale” rates for sales between utilities 
are not subject to regulatory tariffs. Completely unregulated wholesale rates would not 
enjoy a Keogh immunity.
23
 
Further, the antitrust action must be against the rate itself, not against an underlying 
conspiracy that may have produced the rate. Thus in Georgia
24
 the Supreme Court 
permitted an action challenging a conspiracy among railroads to charge a high rate, but 
not their subsequent filing; nor did the state of Georgia seek damages for any 
                                                 
20
See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988) (non-antitrust case; 
filed rate doctrine does not turn on “whether a particular matter was actually determined in the 
FERC proceedings”); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347 (2d 
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 409, 417 n.19 (1986). 
21
Further, a court may be able to review the commission's decision under the ordinary rules 
for review of administrative decisions. Miss. Power, supra, 487 U.S. at 375. 
22
However, see ¶b for application under deregulation, where rates may not be “filed” in any 
meaningful sense at all. 
23
Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 614 (11th Cir. 1995) (Keogh 
would not apply if the particular service that the plaintiff wished to purchase from the defendant 
(wholesale power) was not covered by the tariff fixing the rates). See also Stand Energy Corp.v. 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 631 (S.D.W.V. 2005), partial 
reconsideration, 521 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D. W.Va. 2007) (filed rate doctrine did not bar challenge 
by competing gas shippers to defendants' “parking and lending” agreement under which 
defendants mutually allocated space for inventorying natural gas, because this agreement was not 
covered by any filed tariff); E.&J. Gallo Winery v. Encana Energy Servs., Inc., 2005 WL 
2230530, 2005-2 Trade Cas. ¶74,955 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2005) (whether filed rate doctrine 
barred plaintiffs' claims presented a fact question where it was not clear that the retail rates paid 
by the plaintiff were determined in accordance with filed wholesale rates; the retail rates, which 
themselves were not filed, could have been set without any reference to the wholesale rates; 
court assumed that if the retail rate was “pegged,” or formulated from the wholesale rate, then 
filing of the wholesale rate precluded a challenge to the retail rate). 
24
See Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). 
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overcharge based on the filed rate.
25
 In Brown the Ninth Circuit applied similar 
reasoning to permit an antitrust action against an alleged cartel of title insurers:
26
 “if 
those rates were the product of unlawful activity prior to their being filed and were not 
subjected to meaningful review by the state, then the fact that they were filed does not 
render them immune from challenge.” 
Keogh generally offers no protection to rates that are merely filed but later are 




 the Second Circuit 
allowed antitrust challenges to “ultimately ‘disapproved tariffs…when…the regulatory 
agency expressly refuses to commit itself pending investigation.’” However, the 
protection does run to rates that are filed and approved but are subsequently 
disapproved by a court. In Wheat Rail
29
 the Seventh Circuit concluded that all Keogh 
required was Commission approval. Once that approval was given, the rate became 
mandatory, and to make it the basis for a later antitrust claim would impose too much 
uncertainty on the carrier.
30
 Indeed, refusing to apply the doctrine to judicially 
disapproved rates would eviscerate it, for the entire premise of challenges to filed rates 
is that there is something wrong with them, and a court that awarded treble antitrust 
damages for filed rate overcharges would in effect be disapproving them. 
Most courts hold that Keogh precludes only antitrust claims going to the amount of a 
filed rate for a purchased service. Thus the Litton court also held Keogh inapplicable to 
AT&T's imposition of a charge for an “interconnection” device it required before 
connecting Litton to its system. Although Litton was a customer with respect to the 
charge and the charge was filed as a tariff, the issue was “not the reasonableness of the 
interface tariff rate as compared to some other rate that might have been charged, but 
instead whether the [interface] requirement itself was reasonable, i.e., whether there 
should have been any charge at all.”
31
 However, in Stanislaus the Ninth Circuit barred 
one particular claim of refusal to deal.
32
 The plaintiffs alleged that because the 
defendant purchased large quantities of gas, it did not have pipeline space available for 
                                                 
25
Congress responded to Georgia by passing the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 49 U.S.C. §10706, 
which exempted joint ratemaking that has been presented to and approved by the ICC, but not a 
secret cartel unknown to the ICC. 
26
Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 117 
(1994) (alleging that title insurers first fixed the rates for title search services and then submitted 
them to the agency). 
27
City of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 929 (2d Cir. 1981). 
28
Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 700 F.2d 785, 820 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 
(1984). 
29
Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litig., 759 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 
U.S. 1158 (1986). 
30
Id. at 1315. 
31
Litton, supra, 700 F.2d at 820. Cf. Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 
1013 (D. Mont. 2000), aff’d but criticizing, 328 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (Keogh did not bar 
claims that were not based on the rate elements of a filed tariff, but on interconnection and duty 
to deal elements). 
32
Cnty. of Stanislaus v. PG&E Co., 114 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1076 
(1998). 
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the plaintiffs to make alternative gas purchase arrangements. As a result of the large 
purchases, the plaintiffs were both required to pay higher prices and in some cases 
were prevented from buying natural gas elsewhere. But, as the court noted, both the 
rate that the defendant charged and the quantity that it purchased had received agency 
approval, which established the “import volume as conclusively reasonable and thereby 
foreclose[d] any challenge to importation volumes.”
33
 
Finally, Keogh applies to rates that are filed with a government agency but not to 
rates set by private associations or committees. Thus in Wileman the Ninth Circuit 
refused to apply Keogh in a state antitrust challenge to rates made by private 
committees of producers appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.
34
 
The Filed Rate Doctrine Under Deregulation 
Keogh's application becomes more complex and even less rational under partial 
deregulation. Today, for example, some rates must be “filed” with the overseeing 
agency although the agency has little power to adjust the rates except in extraordinary 
circumstances. For example, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980
35
 created a “zone of rate 
freedom” within which the now dismantled ICC had little authority to interfere with 





 the Seventh Circuit applied Keogh even though the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
38
 forbade the ICC from questioning the 
reasonableness of a filed rate unless it first determined that those filing it had market 
dominance or independently found that the rates were unjustifiably discriminatory. The 
court declared that creating the “ICC's jurisdiction to prevent unjust discrimination in 
rates was the ‘paramount’ purpose of Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce 
Act.”
39
 Since the Regulatory Reform Act had not diminished the ICC's power over unjust 
discrimination, Keogh was to be fully applied. 
In its far-ranging Texas Commercial Energy decision, the Fifth Circuit held that 
Keogh barred an electricity reseller's claim that it paid too high a rate to a regulated 
                                                 
33
Id. at 864, citing Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962-963 
(1986), which in turn had concluded that Keogh is not limited to rates “per se” but also applied to 
the regulatory agency's allocation decision. 
34
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1990). The decision raises 
issues of determining who is the state and who is a private party—often considered by courts 
addressing the Parker immunity. See ¶224b. Cf. Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 872 F.2d 1401, 
1409 (9th Cir.), amended, 886 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990) 
(Keogh does not bar price-fixing claim against oil companies who claimed their jointly made 
prices were based on federally enacted price ceilings). 
35
94 Stat. 803, codified at 49 U.S.C. §10706(b)(3)(B)-(D). 
36
The procedure is described in Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 755 F.2d 1292 (7th 
Cir. 1985). 
37
Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litig., 759 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 
U.S. 1158 (1986). 
38
Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976), codified at 49 U.S.C. §10,709. 
39
Wheat Rail, supra, 759 F.2d at 1311, quoting Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163. 
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utility as a result of the latter's market manipulation.
40
 The court rejected the argument 
that Keogh did not apply because the agency did not regulate in the traditional sense 
and the actual rates charged were set by the market. The court affiliated itself with 
decisions in the First and Ninth Circuits: 
 
We agree with the approach taken by other circuits.…In 
Norwood
41
…the First Circuit concluded that the filed rate doctrine 
applied to market-based energy rates because FERC was 
“responsible for ensuring ‘just and reasonable’ rates and, to that 
end, wholesale power rates continue to be filed and subject to 
agency review.”
42
 The Ninth Circuit echoed this view, noting that 
while FERC had waived many requirements that it had applied 
under a cost-based system, the filed rate doctrine continued to 
apply to market-based energy rates because the agency continued 
to “oversee wholesale electricity rates…by reviewing and approving 
a variety of documents filed by [market actors].”
43
 Similarly, under 
Bill 7, PUCT [the state agency] is required to ensure “safe, reliable, 
and reasonably priced electricity” and “that ancillary services 
necessary to facilitate the transmission of electric energy are 
available at reasonable prices with terms and conditions that are 
not unreasonably preferential, prejudicial, discriminatory, predatory, 
or anticompetitive.” PUCT also requires electricity generators to file 
detailed information to assess market power and even a market 
power mitigation plan for those generators that control more than 
20% of the electricity market in a specific region.
44
 
Nor was the court moved by an antitrust saving clause contained in the federal 
regulatory legislation.
45
 First, the court held, the filed rate doctrine was an inherent part 
                                                 
40
Tex. Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1091 (2006). 
41
Referring to Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 818 (2000). 
42
Citing and quoting Id. at 419. 
43
Citing and quoting Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 
384 F.3d 756, 760-761 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1149 (2005). 
44
Texas Commercial, supra, 413 F.3d at 509-510, citing Tex. Util. Code Ann. §§35.004(e), 
39.101(a)(1), and 39.155-156. 
45
Tex. Util. Code Ann. §39.158(b): 
 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to confer immunity from state or 
federal antitrust laws. This chapter is intended to complement other state 
and federal antitrust provisions. Therefore, antitrust remedies may also be 
sought in state or federal court to remedy anticompetitive activities. 
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With that, the court concluded that Keogh applied even though the rate was 
apparently not “filed” at all. Rather, it was enough that the state regulatory commission 
exercised “oversight over the market.”
47
 This seems to be an unwarranted extension of 
a doctrine that even the Supreme Court concedes is justified only by precedent. As 
weak as Keogh's rationales for the filed rate doctrine were when they were first 
formulated, they are virtually nonexistent when the rate in question is not subject to filing 
at all and the firm has unrestrained power to set its own rates. Nothing in either of the 
Supreme Court's Keogh or Square D decisions suggests that an agency's background 
regulation should serve as a substitute for a filed rate, particularly when there is no 
evidence that the state agency was actively regulating the market in question. The 
issues that the court was addressing should more properly have been considered under 
the “state action” doctrine,
49
 a doctrine that would have required a clear declaration of 
state policy to displace the antitrust laws and then a showing of active supervision of the 
privately set prices. 
In Berning
50
 the Ninth Circuit held that Keogh barred a challenge to alleged 
monopolistic prices of hops sold under marketing orders authorized by the Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937
51
 and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. The marketing 
orders did not stipulate the price at which the hops were to be sold; rather the orders 
allocated the amount of hop production for sale that would be permitted to hop 
producers. In applying Keogh, the court equated regulatory approval of an output level 
with approval of a price. While this outcome might be correct in a case involving hops, 
which we presume have no good substitutes, it might not be correct in a case such as 
railroad transportation, for which trucking or other transport modes are substitutes. In 
such a case an order limiting the volume of railroad transportation would not necessarily 
increase its price, for the decline in railroad transportation might be offset by an 
increase in competing truck or other forms of transportation. In sum, the Ninth Circuit's 
conclusion was valid only on the premise that hops define a relevant market. 
Even then, one wonders whether the logic of Keogh applies. For example, goods 
                                                 
46
Texas Commercial, supra, 413 F.3d at 508-509. Somewhat problematically, the court also 
held that the Saving Clause immunized the rate from challenge under state antitrust law. The 
court noted that the federal Keogh rule applies to both federal and state filed rates, citing H.J. 
Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 1992); Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483 (11th 
Cir. 1992); Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647 (E.D. Tex. 1999). In addition it held 
that the state claims “do not need to be addressed separately” because the state statute “mandates 
that its provisions be interpreted in harmony with federal antitrust law,” citing Johnson v. Hosp. 
Corp. of Am., 95 F.3d 383, 391 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996). However, a general rule of construction 
would usually give way to a specific provision such as this saving clause. 
47
Texas Commercial, supra, 413 F.3d at 509-510. 
49
See 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶224-227. 
50
See Berning v. Gooding, 643 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D. Or. 1985), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1550 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
51
7 U.S.C. §§601 et seq. 
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sold subject to an agency-approved output limitation but not price controls could be sold 
to different buyers at different prices, especially in markets where price discrimination is 
possible, thus undermining Keogh's concerns about price discrimination. Further, the 
best policy is generally to construe irrational doctrines narrowly and, as the Supreme 
Court virtually conceded in Square D, the filed rate doctrine in antitrust is in large 
measure irrational and justifiable only on grounds of stare decisis.
52
 
As previously noted, Keogh's limitation to “filed” rates is particularly relevant in a 
deregulated regime. For example, federal legislation passed in 1995 abolishes many of 
the attributes of motor transport regulation, including for many carriers any requirement 
that rates be filed with an agency. Rather, certain classes of rates must be published 
privately by the carrier and made available to prospective customers.
53
 Because such 
rates are not submitted to any regulatory agency and thus are not subjected to agency 
review even in principle, they enjoy no Keogh immunity. 
Competitor Suits 
Justice Brandeis's rationales for the filed rate doctrine given in Keogh apply mainly, if 
not exclusively, to challenges brought by customers claiming that the rate is 
monopolistic or the product of collusion. Square D was also a suit by firms who acted 
only as purchasers.
54
 Competitor lawsuits are a different matter. Many courts have 
allowed antitrust damage actions by actual or potential competitors against allegedly 
predatory filed rates. For example, in Cost Management and Barnes the Ninth Circuit 
permitted challenges to allegedly predatory rates designed to exclude potential 
competitors from the market.
55
 Similarly, Kirkwood allowed a claim that defendant's filed 
rates imposed a “price squeeze” upon the plaintiff.
56
 
Of course, in competitor lawsuits damages are ordinarily based on the plaintiff's lost 
                                                 
52
For thoughtful commentary, see Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial 
Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1591 (2003). 
53
See also CTC Commc’ns v. Bell Atl. Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D. Me. 1999) (no filed rate 
immunity for BOC's unreasonable terms in selling wholesale communications services for resale, 
when the policies were not contained in any filed tariffs). Cf. Tex. Commercial, supra, 413 F.3d 
503.(apparently applying Keogh to a rate that was not filed in the traditional sense). 
54
Actually, it was a class action by a group of shippers against an alleged cartel of trucking 
companies. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347 (2d Cir. 
1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 409, 411 (1986). 
55
Cost Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. Wash. Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 944-945 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(citing ANTITRUST LAW, and Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of 
Competition and Its Practice §19.6 (4th ed. 2011); Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
56
City of Kirkwood v. Union Electric Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1178 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1170 (1983). On price squeezes generally, see 3B ANTITRUST LAW ¶767c; in the public 
utility context, see id., ¶787c2. 
Cf. Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2005) (filed 
rate doctrine did not bar claim by consumers that insurers conspired to boycott a broker who was 
attempting to bring into the market more competitive nonconspiring insurers). 
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profits rather than on a claim that it paid too much.
57
 Thus at least some of the 
rationales given for Keogh would seem not to apply. Nevertheless the courts are not 
entirely in agreement. Even where railroads were charged with illegally combining to fix 
prices and to monopolize the movement of iron ore through Lake Erie docks to inland 
steel mills, the Sixth Circuit held in Pinney Dock that a rival dock owner was precluded 
by Keogh from obtaining damages based on allegedly excessive railroad rates that the 
plaintiff or its customers paid.
59
 The court declined to regard Keogh either as irrelevant 
to a competitor's suit or as a total bar. 
By contrast, the Third Circuit, looking at part of the same alleged conspiracy, found 
Keogh inapt.
60
 Although “the success of anticompetitive non-rate activity would 
coincidentally implicate rates promulgated under the jurisdiction of the ICC,” it was “fully 
consistent” with Keogh “to accept these rates as lawful and nonetheless to conclude 
that through non-rate activities…the railroads effectively retarded entry of lower cost 
competitors into the market.” The court concluded that the filed tariff doctrine has “little 
or nothing to do” with the regulated firms' duties to its competitors, who are not “the 
intended beneficiaries” of this rule of public utility regulation.
61
 
We agree with those decisions refusing to apply Keogh to competitor suits. First, as 
¶a noted, Keogh is difficult to justify on policy grounds. The more recent Square D 
decision, which was also a consumer suit, rested entirely on stare decisis, and stare 
decisis is no reason for expanding the domain of a poor decision. Second, 
anticompetitively low rates by regulated firms can be a much more significant problem 
than predatory pricing generally, which is quite rare.
62
 In many regulatory regimes 
complex tariff structures permitting different prices to different market segments are 
common, and a frequent result is cross-subsidization; that is, high rates from one part of 
the regulated market are used to offset low rates in another part. Absent effective 
agency supervision, such a scheme can be used to exclude rivals from one portion of 
the market. For example, AT&T once allegedly used high local telephone rates to offset 
artificially low long distance rates, thus making it more difficult for other firms to provide 
long distance service in competition with AT&T. The low rates for local service did not 
attract new entry, however, because AT&T had both a hard-wired natural monopoly as 
                                                 
57
Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(“The plaintiff's damages will be measured not by the difference between existing rates and some 
hypothetical rates, but by business losses it has allegedly sustained”). 
59
Pinney Dock & Transport Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 880 (1988). 
60
Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 510 
U.S. 1021, 1032 (1993). See also Capital Freight Servs., Inc. v. Trailer Marine Transport Corp., 
704 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), which stated the issue in similar terms, disagreed with 
Pinney, and declared that Square D “saved Keogh from extinction” but “did not breathe a new 
expansive energy into the doctrine.” Id. at 1195. It regarded Pinney as expanding Keogh, 
although it recognized that Pinney merely excluded recovery based on allegedly excessive rates 
charged a customer who was also a competitor. Id. at 1195 & n.2. 
61
Lower Lake Erie, supra, 998 F.2d at 1161, quoting Essential Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. AT&T 
Co., 610 F.2d 1114, 1121 (3d Cir. 1979). 
62
See 3A ANTITRUST LAW Ch. 7C. 
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well as a statutory monopoly of local service.
63
 Finally, the regulatory process is typically 
quite solicitous of the views of customers but frequently much less so of the views of 
competitors who might be affected by discriminatory rates. 
In such cases Keogh should not be applied as an additional bar to antitrust 
enforcement. Rather, application of the antitrust laws should rest, as it usually does, on 
the power of the agency to immunize conduct and the extent and nature of its 
supervision. The problem with Keogh, as previously noted, is that its immunity is 
invoked merely upon the “filing” of the rate in question, with no attention given to the 
degree of government supervision or review of the ratemaking process. 
Finally, as the previous discussion suggests, some firms stand in both a purchaser 
and a competitor relationship to the regulated firm. This is common in the 
telecommunications industry, where competitive local exchange carriers, or CLECs, 
typically purchase telecommunications services from incumbent local exchange 
carriers, or ILECs. In such cases the CLEC's status under Keogh depends on the nature 
of the antitrust challenge. For example, if the claim is that the CLEC is overcharging for 
some service, Keogh should bar the claim.
64
 By contrast, if the claim is one of 
exclusionary practices targeting the plaintiff as a rival, Keogh would not apply.
65
 
In Utilimax the plaintiff purchased power from the defendant, a power generator, and 
then resold it in competition with the defendant.
66
 The Third Circuit refused to apply a 
“competitor” exception to Keogh. Although the plaintiff competed with the defendant in 
resale, the basis of the suit was the high prices it was forced to pay to the defendant, 
thus making it a customer rather than a competitor for the purposes of this lawsuit.
67
 By 
contrast, Frontier permitted a filed tariff to be challenged by a plaintiff who both bought 
from and competed with the defendant.
68
 The tariff was allegedly designed to prevent 
the plaintiff from entering a particular part of the tour bus market. 
Equity Relief vs. Damages 
In its Georgia
69
 decision the Supreme Court indicated that the Keogh holding applied 
                                                 
63
See 3B ANTITRUST LAW ¶786. 
64
The courts have so held with respect to consumer claims against CLECs. See Goldwasser v. 
Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 402 (7th Cir. 2000); and Stein v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 173 F. Supp. 
2d 975 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 172 Fed.Appx. 192 (9th Cir. 
2006), on remand, 2007 WL 831750 (N.D.Cal. 2007). 
65
See Tex. Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 509-510 (5th Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1091 (2006). (although defendant electric utility was both generator and 
distributor, Keogh applied when the claims were based on its role as supplier to the plaintiff 
distributor). 
66
Utilimax.com, Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC, 378 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2004). 
67
Accord Pinney Dock & Transport Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988), explained by Capital Freight Servs., Inc. v. Trailer Marine 
Transport Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
68
Frontier Enters., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Cal. 1985). See 
also Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). 
69
 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 454-462 (1945). 
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to damages claims but not to equity claims—that is, that the doctrine operated not as an 
“immunity” but rather as a limitation on damages awards. As the Court then elaborated 
in Square D: 
 
We disagree, however, with petitioners' view that the issue in 
Keogh and in this case is properly characterized as an “immunity” 
question. The alleged collective activities of the defendants in both 
cases were subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws by the 
Government and to possible criminal sanctions or equitable relief. 
Keogh simply held that an award of treble damages is not an 
available remedy for a private shipper claiming that the rate 
submitted to, and approved by, the ICC was the product of an 
antitrust violation. Such a holding is far different from the creation of 
an antitrust immunity, and makes the challenge to Keogh's role in 
the settled law of this area still more doubtful.
70
 
In its Norwood decision,
71
 however, the First Circuit distinguished both, noting that 
both cases alleged a cartel that filed a rate, and an injunction would do no more than 
prohibit the firms from colluding in the future prior to their rate filings. In contrast, the 
case in front of it involved unilateral conduct, and an injunction would require the 
defendant to alter its tariffs, something that Keogh prohibited.
72
 
                                                 
70
 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 
476 U.S. 409, 422 (1986). The Court observed in a footnote that “… a critical distinction remains 
between an absolute immunity from all antitrust scrutiny and a far more limited nonavailability 
of the private treble-damages remedy.…” Id., n.28. 
See also McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980), citing 
Keogh for this proposition: 
 
Even where there is an inability to prove that concerted activity has 
resulted in legally cognizable damages, jurisdiction need not be impaired, 
though such a failure may confine the available remedies to injunctive 
relief. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 452-463 (1945); 
Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). 
Accord Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 260 (1972); Goldwasser v. 
Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2000). 
71
 Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 419 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
531 U.S. 818 (2000). 
72
See id. at 419-420: 
 
Norwood also objects that the filed rate doctrine only protects against 
damage claims and, it says, in this instance it seeks declaratory and 
injunctive relief; apparently it contemplates relief that would block or 
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Two situations must be distinguished, however. Keogh very likely does preclude an 
injunction that would require a firm to charge in the future a rate different from a 
previously filed tariff mandated.
73
 But there is no reason to think Keogh would prohibit 
an injunction against an antitrust violation attending some tariff that would or might be 
filed in the future. Such a tariff has not been “filed” at all. 
Rates Filed With State Regulators 
Supreme Court analysis of filed rates has focused on rates filed with federal 
regulatory agencies.  By contrast, several lower court decisions have extended the 
doctrine to rates filed with state regulators, generally without distinguishing the issues.1  
                                                                                                                                                             
nullify the termination charge and possibly require the wholesale standard 
offer rates to be made available to it.… 
But in Georgia and Square D, the Court was concerned with possible 
price-fixing conspiracies that conceivably could have been enjoined 
without tampering with the tariffed rates themselves, the relief would 
merely assure non-collaborative individual filings by the supposed 
conspirators. Here, any meaningful relief as to the price squeeze would 
require the alteration of tariffs—and not merely tariffs subject to 
regulation but tariffs actually scrutinized repeatedly by FERC in the 
companion-case proceedings. In part, the rationale for the filed rate 
doctrine is to protect the exclusive authority of the agency to accept or 
challenge such tariffs,—a goal that would be undermined by Norwood's 
distinction in the present case. 
73
See Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1062 (2001): 
 
If the plaintiffs in this case wanted to get a rate change, the version of the 
doctrine that we have described would kick in; but they do not, so it does 
not. Eventually they want a different rate, of course, but at present all they 
are seeking is to clear the decks—to dissolve an arrangement that is 
preventing the telephone company defendants from competing.… 
Accord Tex. Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1091 (2006). 
1
 See, e.g., Sun City Taxpayers’ Ass’n. v. Citizens Utilities Co., 45 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1995) (RICO 
challenge against rate filed with state corporation commission barred by filed rate doctrine); 
Texas Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 2004 WL 1777597, 2004-2 Trade Cas. ¶74,497 
(S.D. Tex. June 24, 2004), aff'd, 413 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1091 
(2006) (doctrine applied to bar rates filed with a state utility commission in a situation outside of 
FERC's jurisdiction; see district court's discussion of intent of Texas legislature); Green v. 
Peoples Energy Corp., 2003 WL 1712566, 2003-1 Trade Cas. ¶73,999 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2003) 
(filed rate doctrine precluded tying challenge to tariff requirement file with state regulator of 
retail electricity that made company-installed gas meters mandatory and required customers to 
pay a fee for them).  See also Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp.,No. 97 C 6788, 1998 WL 60878, at 
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The issue must be distinguished from situations in which plaintiffs attempt to apply state 
law to rates filed with federal agencies – in that case the filed rate doctrine clearly 
applies.2 
Extending the doctrine to state agencies raises the troublesome issue that rate 
filings may serve to confer an effective antitrust immunity in situations where antitrust’s 
“state action” doctrine would not apply.  Interestingly, the Supreme Court's Cantor 
decision permitted an antitrust challenge to a tariff filed with a state regulator by finding 
that the "state action" doctrine did not apply, but never discussed the filed rate doctrine.3 
The filed rate doctrine does not contain anything equivalent to the “active 
supervision” requirement that the state action doctrine compels.4  Indeed, it does not 
even contain an equivalent to the authorization requirement.5  For example, a state 
provision may authorize an exclusionary tariff, giving no thought to competitive 
consequences.  The state agency in turn may approve such requests with little or no 
evaluation.  While the provision in question is unlikely to survive scrutiny under the state 
action doctrine, the tariff filing itself may have effective immunity under the filed rate 
doctrine.  The Third Circuit’s McCray decision applied the filed rate doctrine to price 
fixing among title insurers, expressly rejecting the argument that application required the 
defendant’s to show “meaningful review” by the state regulator.6  The court found “no 
apparent requirement” that the “state action” and filed rate doctrine be “reconciled.”7  
The court did hold that the requirements for state action immunity would probably have 
been met in any event. 
Congress has the authority to create an antitrust immunity even over 
unsupervised private conduct, if it wishes to do so.  The fact that the filed rate doctrine 
requires no real supervision has led us to propose that the doctrine be construed 
                                                                                                                                                             
*7 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 4, 1998), aff'd, 222 F.3d 390, 402 (7th Cir.2000) (applying doctrine to rates 
approved by state public utility comhmissions);  H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 
485, 494 (8th Cir.1992) ( “the rationale underlying the filed rate doctrine applies whether the rate 
in question is approved by a federal or state agency”); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 
1494 (11th Cir.1992) (doctrine “applies with equal force” to state and federal agency rates).  
Contrast Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply filed rate 
doctrine to title insurance tariffs filed with state regulators). 
 
2
 E.g., AT&T Co. v. Central Office Tel. Co., 524 U.S. 214 (1988) (filed rate doctrine barred 
state law contract and tort claims challenging federally filed rate). 
3
 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).  Nor did the district court discuss the 
doctrine; the Sixth Circuit affirmed per curiam.  See 392 F.Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mi. 1974), aff'd per 
curiam, 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975). 
4
 See 1 ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶226-227. 
5
 See id., ¶¶224-225. 
6
 McCray v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2012). 
7
 Id. at 238 n.6.  See also New Jersey Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 451 (3d Cir. 2012).  Cf. Sun 
City Taxpayers’ Ass’n. v. Citizens Utilities Co., 45 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1995) (RICO challenge 
against rate filed with state corporation commission barred by filed rate doctrine). 
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narrowly.  But the states do not have the authority to create a federal antitrust immunity 
over unauthorized or unsupervised private conduct at all.  The most sensible approach 
would be to limit application of the filed rate doctrine as applied to state regulators only 
when the regulatory regime in question would qualify for state action immunity.  Indeed, 
that seems inherent in Supreme Court decisions such as Midcal and Cantor, where the 
provisions found not to be immune under the federal antitrust laws were in fact 
contained in rates or tariffs filed with a state regulator.8  It is perhaps relevant that 
questions concerning the scope of the filed rate doctrine to state antitrust law 
challenges to rates filed with state agencies raise only questions of state law.9 
                                                 
8
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Alum., Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99 & n. 1 (1980) 
(noting that challenged wine prices had to be filed with state agency); Cantor v. Detroit Edison 
Co., 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976).  Cf.  FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 629 (1992) (rates 
filed with insurance regulator; case brought by government agency). 
9
 E.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979 (9
th
 Cir. 2000). 
